Platform or Application...Fish or Fowl?

Everybody claims to have a platform. But having a platform and being a platform company can be two very different things. To be clear, I am talking about "innovation platforms”. In his book The Business of Platforms, Michael Cusumano differentiates between transaction platforms and innovation platforms. Transaction platforms bring together different parties to conduct transactions just like Amazon, eBay, Über, AirBnB, and others do. Innovation platforms provide the foundation for a variety of technology applications.  

The innovation platforms deliver benefits such as greater engineering efficiency by providing a shared technology layer and the ability to customize the deployment for every enterprise.  But the ultimate prize is when the platform attracts other vendors who build their commercial applications on it. This way, the platform enables an ecosystem of partners who build applications that take the platform into new markets.  

A platform strategy is quite different from an application strategy. Platform vendors are courting applications, while application vendors compete with them. Yet, most application vendors claim to have a platform too. So, can they have their cake and eat it? Let’s take a look at a few examples: 

AWS  

AWS is decisively a platform company. As far as I know, they don’t build or sell any applications. AWS is clear in its strategy to attract developers from companies that build applications on it. AWS lives off that. And it lives pretty well. Those application companies are the AWS customers and AWS treats them as such. 

Apple 

Apple too is a platform company. Apple has not one, but multiple platforms including MacOS, iOS, and AppleTV. Apple also builds applications - from office applications such as Pages, Numbers, and Keynote to consumer entertainment applications such as Apple Music, Photos, and Apple TV+. Yet, Apple keeps all its platforms open to any competing application. They have no problem knowing that most MacBook users use Microsoft Office or Google Suite instead of Pages or Numbers. They also don’t make it at all difficult for their consumers to run Netflix or Spotify apps, even if those applications clearly compete with other parts of Apple’s business. That’s what platform vendors do.  

Salesforce 

Contrast that with Salesforce. Salesforce started as an application company but over the years, it developed a robust and widely used platform, Salesforce Platform. Yet when it comes to deciding between selling their applications and letting partners have their share of the deal, Salesforce sales reps never hesitate to push the partner under the bus. Just ask companies such as Conga, FinancialForce, or ServiceMax, companies that have built their business atop the Salesforce Platform but eventually ended up competing with Salesforce. Once Salesforce saw that there is a large enough market opportunity these vendors uncovered, it decided to build an application of its own. That’s not how a platform vendor operates. 

Microsoft 

Microsoft is a converted platform vendor. The company operated as an application company for decades, but since the Satya Nadella era, it appears to have shifted to a platform strategy. For years, Microsoft Office had a complete lock on the desktop productivity market and the company did everything it could to protect that franchise. Sure, Windows was the platform, but the big money was always in Office. In fact, Microsoft’s repeated failures in mobile computing can be directly traced to its strategy to defend MS Office at all costs. They tried, again and again, to squeeze the bloated Windows OS onto a smartphone in order to make it possible to run Office on the mobile devices. That strategy actually made a lot of sense, but it didn’t work. It took another 3 years after Stephen Elop’s “Burning Platform” memo before Satya Nadella took over as CEO and made Azure the primary focus of the company. Today, Azure makes billions for Microsoft and I am writing this article in a free version of Office 365, the cloud-based successor to MS Suite...on a Mac. Microsoft is finally behaving like a platform vendor.  

Oracle 

Oracle has gone through the opposite transformation as Microsoft. Oracle started as a platform vendor. Oracle Database was a platform upon which entire commercial applications were built. Back in the days when I was marketing on-premises software such as Documentum and OpenText, running on Oracle DB was a thing. Yet, Oracle started diversifying into applications back in early 2005. The biggest moves were the hostile take-over of PeopleSoft in 2005 and the introduction of Oracle EBS in 2007. Since then, Oracle was investing more and more into applications, and good for them, because as the cloud arrived, running on Oracle DB became less relevant. Today, Oracle is a full-fledged application player that competes with a myriad of other application vendors. 

 

IBM 

Eh, sorry...does IBM still make software? I have no idea. 

Google 

Google is probably the one company that looks like it is trying to be both. Google Chrome on the desktop, Android on the mobile device, and Google Cloud Platform are all legitimate platforms. At the same time, if anyone stole some business away from Microsoft Office, it’s Google. The Google Suite or Workspace as they call it now (so, 1990s) is becoming quite prevalent today. But in terms of strategy, Google is behaving like a platform vendor. Right now, I’m typing this article in Office 365 within Google Chrome and Google doesn’t seem to mind that at all. This is very different from when you tried to use a Windows version of WordPerfect or Lotus 1-2-3 back in the 1990s. And so, Google is a legit platform vendor. 

Stripe 

The supposedly hottest of the unicorns is at crossroads. Their payments infrastructure looks very much like a platform, powering payments for companies such as SAP, NetSuite, Salesforce, Zuora, and Aria. However, the moment Stripe introduced its own billing application, it effectively declared a war on all those companies. Sure, it will pretend for a while that they can all be friends, but ultimately, Stripe applications such as billing, invoicing, and spend management compete with the vendors that would want to use the Stripe payments infrastructure. That makes Stripe an application vendor, effectively abandoning its platform strategy.

  

Snowflake 

Here’s another beloved unicorn. Snowflake has been so far strictly following a classical platform strategy. Their data warehouse is under the hood of many commercial applications today. All those applications are taking Snowflake into places that Snowflake would have never ventured. Snowflake doesn’t offer any application of its own. Sure, they provide some tools and utilities such as data science and machine learning, data engineering, and cybersecurity, but those are never competing with the applications such as billing or fleet management that are taking advantage of Snowflake. Yes, Snowflake is a purebred platform company. 

Conclusion 

There are very few real platform companies. There might be many that claim to have a platform, but when it comes down to deciding between their immediate interest and the interest of their ecosystem, they are forced to show their true colors. Prioritizing the ecosystem over the short-term interests is a tough call to make for any software company. But those that dare to take that path earn the great prize. Just look at AWS, Apple, Microsoft, Google, and Snowflake – these platform companies are pursuing the platform strategy and killing it.  

Sure, you can be a very successful application company that doesn’t really care about being a platform. If you grow big enough, you may even attract an ecosystem of applications. Salesforce and Oracle are a good proof of that. But you can’t be both. You can’t pretend to have a platform company while competing with the companies that hitch their future to your platform. Yet that’s exactly what companies like Salesforce and Stripe do. 

The bottom line is that you can make a great, successful business out of being a platform or an application company. But you have to choose. 

 

Kindle Fire - The Price Is Right

Today, Amazon announced the long awaited Kindle Fire, a new tablet based on the Android mobile operating system. While the announcement was expected, the aggressive price has caught many by surprise. $199 for an Android-based tablet makes it the most aggressively priced tablet on the market. But is that the right price? Let’s take a closer look!

The $199 Kindle Fire could be a game changer

The entire tablet market should be grateful to HP for having recently conducted the largest price elasticity of demand (PED) test ever. If you remember, HP launched their TouchPad with the base price of $499.99. They reportedly manufactured 270,000 of the TouchPads, but after several months of trying, they had sold less then 10% of their inventory (25,000). After pulling the plug on the device, they sold the remaining inventory within hours for $99 a piece.

Being a marketer (and a techno geek), I actually tried to compute the price elasticity of demand for the TouchPad, coming up - as expected - with a high negative number. I got -549, but it’s been many years since business school (note: yes Professor, I have simplified my case by ignoring any substitutes, necessity factor, purchase power, brand loyalty, blah, blah, blah...doesn’t matter in this case). That low of a number means that the price is highly elastic which in turn means that buyers strongly respond to price changes. Duh. It also means that to optimize revenue (or better to grab as much market share as possible), you have to price the product near its marginal cost. Again, not a surprise - you make something and you want to sell as much of it as possible, you keep the price as low as possible to the cost of making it. Duh.

The cost of making the iPad is approximately $229 and we have to assume that Amazon could be in the same range. They can probably sell similar volumes as Apple has and thus have a similar negotiating power with their suppliers. The Kindle Fire might be a tad cheaper to manufacture with less memory and a smaller size. That suggests that at $199, Amazon is pricing the device at or just below cost - as my little price elasticity test suggests.

BTW, if you dismiss my simple price elasticity calculation and instead want to believe the efficient markets theory, you should remember that the discounted TouchPad was selling on eBay for $250. That seams to be the optimal price point at which the demand and supply clear.  Even if Amazon is losing $50 on each Kindle as the Piper Jaffray analyst Gene Munster suggests, it doesn’t matter. Amazon is not looking for any margin contribution from the Kindle Fire (or any Kindle). They are looking for market share and units sold - eyeballs. The margin comes from the content which Amazon can sell to the people who have their devices.

This is also the reason why the other Android vendors such as Samsung, Acer, HTC, LG, Dell, etc cannot play this game. Even if they can match the cost of manufacturing their devices, which I doubt as their volumes are not anywhere near the millions of iPads Apple sold and the millions of Kindle Fires that Amazon is likely to sell, they still need the devices to generate positive margin contribution. They don’t have any content to sell to offset that. Apple, on the other hand, is sitting in the perfect spot today by getting margin contribution from both, the content and the devices. Beat that, … [everybody else]!

The content is critical. The Nook by Barnes&Noble is a comparable reader to the Kindle Fire and it has been on the market for several months now, priced at $250. But since B&N doesn’t have anywhere near the reach of Amazon with its online store, the device hasn’t made a dent into the market shares. Amazon’s new Kindle Fire is no slam dunk but given the success of the original Kindle, we have to assume that they are now a serious player. This is particularly true given the aggressive price of the device with an entire content ecosystem under their control - anything from e-books, magazines, to music and movies.

And so what will happen next? Amazon Kindle Fire is likely going to grab some significant market share in the tablet market. Apple may experience some pricing pressure but will still have the benefit of the Apple brand and user experience - the same brand that permits Apple to charge a premium on their iMac and MacBook computers. While the prices might come down a little, I wouldn’t expect any $199 iPads anytime soon.

All other manufacturers are in trouble. Microsoft must quickly deliver a tablet at all costs because with Kindle Fire, there is another runaway tablet on the market using zero code from Microsoft. All the Android vendors, except for Motorola, who’s now engaged to Google, have even more reason to reconsider their Android bet. They are going to be forced into a price war with Amazon which they can’t win given Amazon’s scale and pricing power. Switching into the Microsoft camp might be the only sustainable move left for them. But the longer Microsoft waits, the less market share will be left to grab. As for RIM, the PlayBook looks like an official failure now and their options are shrinking fast...